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A B S T R A C T   
We examine how nutrient load compensation could help a firm expand its production when production is a 
source of nutrient loads, threatening the ecological status of a water body. We ask whether compensation is 
technically feasible and whether it can be made in an ecologically sustainable way. Credits for compensation may 
be provided by point or nonpoint sources. We apply our approach to the case of Finnish Lake Kallavesi, where the 
Supreme Administrative Court, based on the Water Framework Directive, refused an environmental permit for a 
plan to build a large pulp mill. We employ a lake nutrient response model to determine water quality using 
probabilistic analysis of the ecological status of the lake. The supply potential of phosphorus credits from point 
sources was too low to keep the lake in good ecological status with at least 80% probability and must be 
complemented by credits from agricultural nonpoint sources. Using a trade ratio of 1:1.2 to reflect uncertainty on 
credits from nonpoint sources suggests that the reduction in agricultural phosphorus loading would suffice on its 
own to ensure the good ecological status by 90% probability. The cost of buying nutrient reduction credits would 
be at most 2% of the investment.   
1. Introduction 
The ecological status of surface waters in the EU has not improved as 
originally planned in the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The WFD 
requires water bodies in the EU to achieve good ecological status by 
2027 and additionally requires that the status of no water body shall 
deteriorate (2000/60/EC). Since 2013, the Weser ruling (C-461/13) by 
the European Court of Justice gave the WFD a high standing by dictating 
that its objectives are legally binding. In the spirit of the WFD, deteri-
oration here refers to a quality reduction in any of the indicators 
included in the definition of the ecological status of water bodies. These 
indicators include biological variables, such as phytoplankton, macro-
phytes and phytobenthos, which are especially sensitive to nutrient 
loads, as well as phosphorus and nitrogen directly (Lyche-Solheim et al., 
2013; Dudley et al., 2013). Therefore, no increase in production causing 
water pollution is allowed if the increase in pollution weakens any in-
dicator of water quality (see more from, e.g., Paloniitty, 2016, and 
Paloniitty and Kotamäki, 2021). 
The Weser ruling provides a true challenge for firms wanting to 
expand or for new firms entering the market in cases where production 
causes nutrient loading and water quality is at risk. What kind of op-
portunities do new and expanding firms have in this situation? Ideally, 
the firm would invest in full water recycling so that the Weser ruling 
would not cause any problems. Unfortunately, this is seldom a possi-
bility. Another option is to increase the abatement of nutrients to very 
high levels, which leads to gradually increasing costs. A third option is to 
reduce nutrient loading by decreasing the scale of the planned polluting 
production. As a drawback, this may often also reduce profits, threat-
ening the whole investment. Therefore, a fourth option for these firms is 
to finance nutrient load reductions in other firms located in the same 
water body to the extent that this reduction fully compensates for the 
change in water quality caused by the nutrients from the expanding or 
new firm. Although not yet legally allowed in Finland but provided that 
it is made feasible, these firms could buy nutrient reduction credits to 
maintain the current water quality and expand their production. For 
bought nutrient reduction credits, it must generally hold that credits are 
real, verifiable, additional, and enforceable (Ribaudo et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, activities that generate credits must be new, must have 
been undertaken voluntarily (not legally mandated), and cannot be 
funded by other conservation incentive programs (Shortle, 2013). 
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In this paper, the term nutrient load reduction unit refers to a per-
manent (or long-term in the case of nonpoint sources) reduction of 
nutrient loading below the baseline, business as usual or regulator-set 
level. This reduction produces nutrient reduction credits, which, once 
verified, are units that can be sold. Nutrient load compensation refers to 
the use of these credits to compensate for the increase in nutrient loads 
by the investing firm either partially or fully. Nutrient load compensa-
tion is based on a trade between the investing firm (the buyer) and the 
firm producing nutrient reduction credits (the seller) with the goal of 
keeping water quality in good ecological status (or at least not wors-
ening the status). Provided that the seller receives a payment that at 
least covers the production costs of the nutrient reduction credits, it is 
profitable for the seller to produce them in the market. Thus, provided 
that there are enough credits for sale, the investing firm could 
compensate for the increase in loading by buying credits to ensure that 
water quality does not deteriorate. For the investing firm, important 
questions are how great the supply of nutrient reduction credits is and at 
what price credits can be bought. For the regulator, the main questions 
are how reliably water quality impact can be assessed, how large the risk 
of not achieving the good status is acceptable, and what status nutrient 
load compensation can be given. 
The idea of nutrient load compensation is relatively new, although 
well-known from climate policy. Multiple firms regard carbon neutrality 
as an important part of their environmental responsibility. Additionally, 
discussions on ecological compensation to stop biodiversity loss are 
widespread, and in the US, ecological compensation is mandatory for 
development projects in wetlands and streams (see, e.g., McKenney and 
Kiesecker, 2010). Producing nutrient reduction credits for compensating 
water pollution currently takes place in water quality trading (WQT) 
programs, which concern phosphorus, nitrogen and sediment, which are 
located mostly in the US (Selman et al., 2009). Many of these programs 
impose mandatory policies via a cap on point sources and allow 
voluntary participation for nonpoint sources (for reviews on WQT 
schemes in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, see Shortle, 
2013 and Selman et al., 2009). A special form of water quality trading is 
the credit offset trading (COT) scheme. In this scheme, point sources 
may buy nutrient reduction credits from other regulated point sources or 
nonregulated nonpoint sources to comply with the regulation when the 
point source’s own abatement costs are too high (King and Kuch, 2003; 
Shabman and Stephenson, 2007; Woodward and Kaiser, 2002). There-
fore, COTs provide a type of “regulator-approved” trading (Keeler, 2008; 
Morgan and Wolverton, 2008). This mechanism comes close to the 
nutrient load compensation schemes we are examining in this paper. 
However, compliance is not always the motivation for compensation. 
Very recently, some firms have announced nutrient (or phosphorus) 
neutrality as their environmental goal (see, for instance, John Nurminen 
Foundation, 2016), and neutrality is pursued with nutrient load 
compensation. Thus, a deeper examination of nutrient load compensa-
tion is more than warranted. 
In this paper, we examine how nutrient load compensation could 
work as a solution to an expanding or new firm when it must fulfill the 
requirement that water quality in a water body in question is not 
allowed to decrease. We devote special attention to how to make com-
pensations in an ecologically sustainable way. An empirically important 
question, albeit dependent on concrete cases, is whether such compen-
sation is actually available. This relates to the challenge of organizing 
compensation in aquatic environments, which is much more difficult 
than for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. While the location of the 
credit provider does not matter at all for GHG emissions, the location of 
both the expanding firm and nutrient reduction credit suppliers matter a 
lot, as nutrients flow and spread in waterways (in economic terms, GHG 
emissions are global pollutants and nutrient loads are regional pollut-
ants). Thus, the location and spreading of nutrients should be considered 
when determining the size of the required compensation and location 
may be the ultimate source of credit scarcity. 
A further issue to consider relates to the origin of credits. Credits 
from point sources reflect a reduction in nutrient loading, which is 
certain. In contrast, credits from agricultural nonpoint sources are sub-
ject to uncertainties due to the stochastic nature of loading (Griffin and 
Bromley, 1982; Shortle and Dunn, 1986). The literature on point- 
nonpoint trading suggests using uncertainty trade ratios to cope with 
the uncertainty relating to nonpoint source credits (e.g., Selman et al., 
2009; Shortle, 2013; Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead, 2013). In general, 
trade ratios address imperfect substitution between point and nonpoint 
polluters and are intended to translate emissions from different sources 
into water quality equivalents. The most typical ratio in US point- 
nonpoint trading has been 2:1; that is, to offset one unit of pollution, a 
point source must buy two credits from nonpoint sources (Shortle et al., 
2021).1 
We develop a theoretical framework to describe the problem, 
including the planned nutrient pulse, the expanding firm’s abatement 
behavior, potential suppliers of offsets, the spreading of the loads in a 
waterbody, and the matching of the nutrient reduction credits to the 
nutrient pulse. We determine the choice of an investing firm given its 
abatement cost function and offset price. We apply our framework to a 
real case in Finland. In Eastern Finland, a forest firm has been planning 
to build a large pulp mill on the shore of Lake Kallavesi, which is in good 
ecological status. The planned pulp mill is, however, very large, and 
although efficient, it would considerably increase nutrient loads to Lake 
Kallavesi (Pöyry, 2015). One must assess whether the increase in 
nutrient load threatens the good ecological status of the lake. Due to this 
threat, the Supreme Administrative Court has not given it an environ-
mental permit (SACF, 2019:166). Thus, we empirically examine 
whether providing full compensation for the increased nutrient load by 
buying nutrient reduction credits from other polluters would aid in 
fulfilling the non-deterioration and precautionary principles and other 
requirements of environmental permitting. We use a nutrient load 
response model of a lake (the lake load response (LLR) model of 
Kotamäki et al., 2015) to estimate the amount of credits needed to avoid 
risking the good ecological status of Lake Kallavesi. The LLR model 
presents outcomes concerning classes of ecological status as probabili-
ties of belonging to a given class (to the good class in our case). We will 
discuss the acceptable probability and the possibilities of combining 
voluntary nutrient load compensation in the current water policy 
structure safely so that water quality can be maintained and expanding 
production can become possible. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to 
the theoretical framework. Section 3 introduces the empirical data and 
modeling, and Section 4 presents the results of the case study calcula-
tions. Section 5 provides our conclusions. 
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we define the demand and supply of nutrient reduc-
tion credits. We start by providing a schematic presentation of the 
framework in Fig. 1. It illustrates a water body, in this case a lake, which 
receives water flow from upstream and releases water downstream. The 
lake itself works as a large stock of water with a stable water content. A 
new or expanding firm is in location r and its effluent affects the water 
quality downstream from its location (illustrated by the black arrow). 
Four potential suppliers of nutrient reduction credits are depicted in the 
figure: three upstream (the gray arrows) and one downstream (the blue 
arrow). Only the three upstream point sources supply credits, as their 
effluents impact the whole area where the expanding firm is polluting. 
Suppose now that the firm in location r increases nutrient loads by an 
amount X. To compensate for the increase in nutrients in the lake 
downstream of r, it buys nutrient reduction credits from, for instance, 
suppliers 1, 2 and 3. Given the hydrological processes, the reduction in 
1 Using trade ratios greater than one has been criticized as they work like a 
tax on point source purchases of nonpoint credits (Horan and Shortle, 2005). 
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nutrients at the source does not mean an equal reduction of nutrients at 
location r. Therefore, one has to determine the delivery ratio, which is 
denoted by β (≤1), which indicates the share of one unit of load 
reduction (A) at the source entering location r. For nutrient reduction 
credits originating from nonpoint sources, the uncertainty trade ratio is 
denoted by α, with α > 1 for nonpoint sources and α = 1 for point 
sources. The firm may have possibilities to increase its own abatement, 
denoted by a. Thus, for the upstream point and nonpoint sources (and 
the firm’s own abatement) to fully compensate for the increase in X, one 
must have the following (with i = 1, …n indicating the point and 





Ai + a ≥ X. (1) 
While Eq. (1) provides the physical requirement for nutrient load 
compensation, this reduction must also be feasible in economic terms, 
that is, the payment for nutrient reduction credits must cover at least the 
costs of providing these credits. Thus, we need to determine the supply 
potential, demand and payment for compensation. 
Suppose that it is technically feasible to fulfill Eq. (1), even though 
this need not always be the case. The new or expanding firm’s possibility 
of obtaining the required credits depends on the abatement costs, C 
(with C′(A) > 0 and C′ ′(A) > 0), of the potential credit suppliers and the 
price of credits. Let q denote the price of offsets; then, the economic 
problem of any potential offset supplier is to maximize the revenue from 
additional reduction of nutrients at location r as follows: 
max qAi − Ci(Ai) (2) 
The first-order condition for the abatement by supplier i is q − Ci′(Ai) 
= 0, indicating that the supplier increases abatement from the baseline 
level up to the point where marginal revenue from nutrient reduction 
credits equals their marginal production (abatement) costs. The supply 
of credits as a function of price and abatement technology can then be 





The properties of this credit supply function are ∂Ai/∂q > 0, indi-
cating that the supply of credits increases with credit price. 
For the firm requiring nutrient reduction credits, we make two as-
sumptions. First, its abatement technology is the best available tech-
nology (BAT), meaning that no technological options are available to 
further reduce effluents (a = 0). Thus, the firm must compensate for all 
remaining emissions. This leads to a vertical demand curve for credits. 
Alternatively, given that the largest abatement that is technically 
possible exceeds the abatement achieved with the ordinary BAT, the 
firm can increase abatement, albeit at a high cost (C(a), a > 0). In this 
case, the firm must compare the higher abatement costs against the 
credit costs. Let a denote abatement beyond the “normal” abatement and 
q continue to be the price of credits at point r. The firm minimizes its 
costs from abating emissions and buying credits, C(a)+ q
∑n
i=1Ai, by 
accounting for the requirement in Eq. (1). The interior solution for the 
firm’s own abatement is defined by C′ (a) − q αiβi = 0. The firm equates its 
marginal costs to the credit price defined at the compensation site via 
transfer of emissions and the type of supplier (point or nonpoint source). 
This choice also defines the amount of credits bought. Note that if all 
credit suppliers are point sources the condition reduces to C′(a) − q/β =
0. For abatement incentives, the firm’s abatement increases with credit 
price (da/dq > 0) and with the uncertainty trade ratio (da/dα > 0), and 
decreases with the delivery ratio (da/dβ < 0). The implication of this 
result is obvious: if a firm has abatement possibilities at high costs, it 
abates more the higher the price of the credits. This means that the 
possibility of using nutrient reduction credits does not need to reduce a 
firm’s incentives to abate pollution. If own abatement is not feasible at 
all, the firm’s costs from credits are simply q
∑n
i=1Ai. 
We now apply this simple model of nutrient reduction credits to our 
empirical case, Lake Kallavesi. We determine the increase in nutrient 
loads, impacts on water quality and required nutrient load 
compensation. 
3. Case study of Lake Kallavesi: water quality change and 
phosphorus offsets 
3.1. Description of Lake Kallavesi 
Lake Kallavesi is located in Eastern Finland, surrounds the city of 
Kuopio and is the largest lake water body in the North Savo region. The 
surface area of the water body is 310 km2, the mean depth is 9.7 m, and 
the maximum depth is 75 m. According to the WFD status class assess-
ment, the current overall ecological status of Lake Kallavesi is good 
(Vallinkoski et al., 2016). For the nutrient conditions in the lake, the 
average phosphorus concentration (17 μg/l) does not exceed the phos-
phorus criteria of the large humic lake type (25 μg/l) and the phosphorus 
status class is good. Because the average nitrogen levels (710 μg/l) in the 
lake are above the nitrogen limit (600 μg/l), the nitrogen status class is 
moderate. The surrogate of phytoplankton biomass, chlorophyll-a, has a 
status class of good, as the average concentration (8 μg/l) does not 
exceed the good status class limit (11 μg/l).2 The water quality criteria in 
Finland are set based on EU’s WFD guidance (EC, 2003) and the Finnish 
national classification system (Aroviita et al., 2012). The quality stan-
dards are based on the amount of deviation from the undisturbed/nat-
ural condition and they depend on the lake’s natural type. The national 
lake types in Finland are defined by the lakes’ surface area, altitude, 
mean depth, color and retention time (Pilke, 2012) which is in line with 
the EU level lake typology (Lyche-Solheim et al., 2013). 
The nonpoint nutrient sources from the lake’s catchment (16,270 
km2), such as the nutrient loads from agriculture, forestry and natural 
background loading, compose a majority of the lake’s overall loads 
(Vallinkoski et al., 2016). Point sources include 11 wastewater treat-
ment plants (WWTPs) with phosphorus loads of 2.3 tons and nitrogen 
loads of 400 tons annually (see Table 2), while phosphorus loads from 
other point sources (many related to peat production areas) amount to 
approximately 3.4 tons annually (YLVA, 2019). 
A pulp firm (Finnpulp) planned to invest in a large pulp mill and 
thereby increase phosphorus loads to the lake by 20 kg per day, ac-
cording to the environmental impact assessment (Pöyry, 2015). This 
would mean an increase of 7.3 tons annually into the lake. Compared to 
other sources, the planned investment would considerably increase 
phosphorus loading. The key issue relating to this plan is whether the 
increased load would lead to a worsening of the water quality in the lake 







Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the determination of a sufficient number of 
nutrient reduction credits. 
2 Please note, that chl-a is not the only possible metrics used in the official 
phytoplankton status assessment (also % of harmful cyanobacteria and phyto-
plankton composition/trophic index). The “chl-a status” is used here due to 
limitations in the data and modeling. 
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might be the means of keeping water quality unchanged and receiving 
environmental permit required to build the plant. 
3.2. Nutrient response model and input data 
To assess the change in water quality, we employ a probabilistic, 
semiempirical lake load response (LLR) model tool that has been 
tailored for Finnish lake management planning (Kotamäki et al., 2015). 
The probabilistic nature of the model means that instead of a single 
output value, LLR produces probability distributions of the response 
variables and therefore accounts for the uncertainty, or the risk, that is 
inevitably related to these types of model-based assessments (Refsgaard 
et al., 2007). LLR predicts the effect of external phosphorus and nitrogen 
load on the phosphorus, nitrogen and chlorophyll-a concentration dis-
tributions and the probabilities of WFD-related status classes with the 
current or additional loadings. Furthermore, LLR enables estimation of 
the critical loading, i.e., the maximum allowable nutrient load that a 
lake can tolerate without shifting from good status to moderate. Given 
that LLR links critical nutrient loading to probabilities of WFD status 
classes, the question of what constitutes acceptable probability enters 
social decision making. We will focus on this in the discussion section. 
In the model, the in-lake nutrient concentrations are estimated as a 
function of the incoming nutrient loads, water outflow, sedimentation 
rate and lake area following the parametrization of the well-known 
mass-balance models (Vollenweider, 1968). It is assumed that the 
water body is completely mixed, there are no concentration gradients, 
and the nutrient concentration in the water body is equal to the con-
centration leaving the water body. In the LLR, the modeled nutrient 
concentrations (and thus the loads) are linked to the lake’s biological 
status with a hierarchical Bayesian model of chlorophyll-a. Fig. 2 illus-
trates how the model combines inflow and outflow and links lake sedi-
ment, nutrients and chlorophyll-a. 
As model input, LLR uses data on nutrient loads, in-lake nutrient 
concentrations and water outflow. For the Kallavesi case, the in-lake 
nutrient concentration data were collected from the open source data-
base of the Finnish Environment Institute (http://www.syke.fi/en- 
US/Open_information). The water quality samples are from the 1 m 
surface layer from the main sampling locations from 1991 to 2017 (n =
373 for total phosphorus and n = 384 for total nitrogen). The nutrient 
loads and the outflow are given as annual sums normalized to daily 
units. The annual nutrient loads and water outflows were derived from 
the national-scale nutrient loading estimation tool VEMALA (Huttunen 
et al., 2016). The VEMALA model is an operational, national-scale 
nutrient loading model for Finnish watersheds. It simulates nutrient 
processes, leaching and transport on land and in rivers and lakes. 
VEMALA can simulate the water quality on a daily basis in rivers and 
lakes larger than one hectare in Finland and provide real-time results at 
the user interface available from the Environmental Administration. 
VEMALA also analyses the contributions of the different loading sources 
to the nutrient loads. The input data obtained from the VEMALA model 
user interface are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3.3. Nutrient loading response and ecological status based on the LLR 
model 
The average long-term phosphorus load to the lake is 0.48 g/m2/a; 
thus, the total average daily load is 406 kg/d. With this load, the model- 
estimated median total phosphorus concentration in Lake Kallavesi is 
22 μg/l. The probability of at least good status was 84%, or the other 
way around, the risk of exceeding the nutrient standard was 16% 
(Fig. 3). 
At 50% probability, i.e., when half of the phosphorus concentration 
measurements would indicate good status, the critical loading would be 
0.54 g/m2/a (459 kg/d) (Fig. 4). This is 11% higher than the average 
loading to the lake and would mean a 50 kg/d surplus over the 
“permissible” phosphorus load. However, allowing the risk to be only 
10% corresponds to the critical load being lower than the current 
loading, leading to the need to reduce the current loading by 30 kg/d. 
Simulating the probabilities from 5 to 95%, the critical loads can vary 
between 0.44 and 0.64 g/m2/a (or 370–548 kg/d). Therefore, depend-
ing on the risk level that the decision-maker is willing to take, the cur-
rent phosphorus load levels should either be reduced, or a small increase 
in phosphorus load could be accepted. 
Using these baseline modeling results, we can now estimate the effect 
of the surplus load from the pulp mill on the phosphorus concentration 
in the lake. The 20 kg/d addition in phosphorus load would increase the 
average load to 426 kg/d, which in turn would shift the median total 
phosphorus to 23 μg/l. 
There is no generally accepted risk level associated with the pre-
cautionary principle, as it ultimately depends on public risk preferences. 
Choosing a low risk, say 5 or 10%, as the value that could be considered 
to reflect the precautionary principle, LLR modeling suggests that the 
required reduction in phosphorus loading to keep the Kallavesi water 
body in good condition should be 56 or 35 kg P/d, i.e., 20,440 or 12,775 
kg/y, respectively. This means that the new pulp mill would need to find 
nutrient reduction credits to fully compensate for the increase in phos-
phorus loads (20 kg/d amounting to 7.3 tons annually). If the risk level 
was chosen to be 20%, the critical load would be 413 kg/d, leading to an 
offset of 13 kg/d, i.e., 4745 kg/y (Table 1). 
To assess the ecological effects in the lake, we used the LLR to 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the functioning and variables of the LLR model: the 
incoming nutrient loads (LTP, LTN), water outflow (Qout), in-lake phosphorus 
and nitrogen concentrations (CTP, CTN) and chlorophyll-a (chl-a). Sediment- 
water exchange and the size and mean depth of the lake are included in the 
model. The lake is represented as a continuously stirred tank reactor (CSTR). 
Figure from Kotamäki et al. (2015). 
Fig. 3. Predictive probability distribution of phosphorus concentrations with 
average phosphorus loadings in Lake Kallavesi. Different colors denote different 
status classes, and the proportion of the color denotes the probability with 
which the status is achieved. The red dashed line is the good/moderate limit, 
and the star denotes the median phosphorus concentration. (For interpretation 
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web 
version of this article.) 
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estimate the chlorophyll-a concentrations with different combinations 
of total phosphorus and total nitrogen loads. The model predicted that 
the median chlorophyll-a concentration with the average long-term 
phosphorus and nitrogen loads is 9.8 μg/l, which stays just under the 
good status class boundary (11 μg/l). Assessing the simultaneous effects 
of nutrient loads on chlorophyll-a suggests phosphorus limitation, with 
low phosphorus loads and high nitrogen loads, and nitrogen limitation, 
with high phosphorus and low nitrogen loads (Fig. 5). Even a small 
addition in the current average phosphorus load in Lake Kallavesi would 
therefore lead to crossing the boundary of good ecological status, 
leading to moderate chlorophyll-a status. This is the case especially if the 
required probability of achieving good status would be chosen to be 
high. 
4. Supply of nutrient reduction credits: adequacy and costs 
We now shift our focus to the potential credit supply and first look at 
the baseline nutrient loading. We start with point sources and continue 
our discussion with agricultural nonpoint sources. After defining the 
baseline, we calculate the possible abatement and the average abate-
ment costs separately for nitrogen and phosphorus. Finally, we discuss 
the potential of nutrient load compensation in the Kallavesi case study. 
4.1. Baseline loading, abatement and costs 
Starting with point sources, the study area contains 11 wastewater 
treatment plants (WWTPs) of sizes less than 1 to approximately 137,000 
person equivalent (PE) (YLVA, 2019); one PE is equal to 70 g/day of 
BOD7 (Hautakangas et al., 2014). To estimate the supply potential and 
the costs of current and additional abatement, we use nutrient abate-
ment cost functions from Hautakangas et al. (2014). Given that all but 
one of the WWTPs are small, the total abatement costs for phosphorus 
and nitrogen, respectively, are as follows: 
CP(x) = 82371+ 3008.7x+ 8.774x2 (4a) 
CN(x) = 104982 − 2009.73x+ 124.883x2 (4b)  
where x refers to the abatement rate. For the Lehtoniemi plant in Kuo-
pio, we use abatement costs intended for plants which are one size class 
larger and given by the following equations: 
CP(x) = 198500+ 8146.4x+ 4.1665x2 (5a) 
CN(x) = 195480+ 354.589x+ 230.259x2. (5b) 
Table 2 collects the baseline data, current abatement rates, loads and 
our estimates on the total abatement costs of the WWTPs. We ordered 
the plants according to the phosphorus abatement potential, that is, the 
current loads. From Table 2, the current abatement rates of phosphorus 
are in most cases already high, and the loads are therefore relatively low, 
indicating a low potential for phosphorus load compensation. The pos-
sibilities for increasing nitrogen abatement are much higher, reflecting 
the current and much laxer abatement requirements set for the WWTPs. 
In addition to the WWTPs, there are numerous other point sources 
around Kallavesi, outputting a total of approximately 3.4 tons P annu-
ally into Kallavesi (Vemala, 2019). The 10 largest of these sources and 
their phosphorus loadings are collected in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Additionally, nonpoint sources contribute considerably to phos-
phorus loading. The North Savo region contributes approximately 14% 
to Finnish beef production (OSF, 2019a); thus, much of the nonpoint 
phosphorus loading relates to the use of manure as fertilizer and the 
accumulated phosphorus reserved in soils (legacy phosphorus). The 
total loads from agriculture and forestry to Kelloselkä (a small part of 
Kallavesi) amount to approximately 47 tons of P annually (VEMALA, 
2019), indicating a large potential for phosphorus reduction. This figure 
is, however, uncertain for many reasons: the effects of the measures 
reducing nutrient runoff are uncertain and this uncertainty is multiplied 
by the stochastic weather conditions that determine the annual nutrient 
loads. The prevailing agricultural support policy and its requirements 
Fig. 4. Total phosphorus (TotP) concentrations as a function of phosphorus 
load with different risk levels (5–50%) for not maintaining good status. The 
blue arrows show the range of phosphorus loadings that keep the phosphorus 
concentration under the good/moderate limit. (For interpretation of the refer-
ences to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of 
this article.) 
Table 1 
Critical phosphorus loads (kg/d), average load with the pulp mill surplus, 
needed load reductions for good total phosphorus status (kg/d) and the required 
pulp mill nutrient load compensation (kg/d) with different risks of not reaching 
good status.  
Probability 
of good TP 
status 





















95% 5% 370 426 56 20 
90% 10% 391 426 35 20 
80% 20% 413 426 13 13 
70% 30% 434 426 0 0 
60% 40% 455 426 0 0 
50% 50% 448 426 0 0 
40% 60% 477 426 0 0 
30% 70% 484 426 0 0 
20% 80% 505 426 0 0 
10% 90% 526 426 0 0 
5% 95% 548 426 0 0  
Fig. 5. Chlorophyll-a concentrations in Lake Kallavesi corresponding to chlo-
rophyll-a status class boundaries, with different phosphorus and nitrogen 
loading combinations. An asterisk indicates the median chlorophyll-a estimate 
with current average nutrient loadings, and dots indicate the observed annual 
loadings in the lake from 1991 to 2017. 
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largely define the expected baseline nutrient loading, abatement and 
costs within agriculture, as the majority of Finnish farmers participate in 
the agri-environmental scheme (Hyvönen et al., 2020). 
4.2. Increasing abatement from point sources 
We first considered WWTPs and increased their phosphorus abate-
ment to 99% and nitrogen abatement to 80%. Table 3 presents the 
reduction in phosphorus loading and the estimated total and average 
costs of increasing abatement in the WWTPs. In this table, the WWTPs 
are ordered according to their average abatement costs. Total abatement 
cost is the difference between the cost from the current and the new 
abatement efficiencies (calculated based on Hautakangas et al., 2014). 
Table 3 shows that the total abatement potential is 0.6 tons, which falls 
6.7 tons short of the required amount of compensation. Average 
abatement costs vary considerably, from 27 €/kg to 5000 €/kg. Given, 
however, that most of the reductions are obtained from the lower part of 
the range, the total cost for the 0.6 t reduction remains rather low at 0.2 
M€. 
Even though the water quality in lakes is typically constrained by 
phosphorus, which is also generally the case for Lake Kallavesi, we next 
consider the possibility that a radical reduction in rather high nitrogen 
loads could improve the status class. Table 4 shows the reduction in 
nitrogen loads from the increase in nitrogen abatement to 80% and our 
estimates of the associated costs; again, the WWTPs are ordered ac-
cording to their average abatement costs. The reduction potential of 
nitrogen is large, almost 259 t/y. The total costs of increased abatement 
range between WWTPs from 0.3 M€ to 1.1 M€. 
We illustrate the abatement cost functions of both nutrients in Figs. 6 
and 7 (the highest cost is excluded to make the lower scale visible). The 
total cost of any abatement level is the area under the line. For example, 
if a firm wanted to compensate 300 kg of phosphorus loads, it could buy 
263 kg of phosphorus reduction credits with an average cost of 27 €/kg 
(from Iisalmen Vesi) and the remaining 37 kg of credits for 174 €/kg 
(from City of Kiuruvesi). Thus, the total cost of compensation of this 
amount would be 263*27 + 37*174 = 13,539 €. 
Other point sources also provide the possibility of phosphorus load 
compensation, but their abatement costs are generally higher than for 
WWTPs. Therefore, we next examined the nutrient reduction potential 
Table 2 
Baseline data of the WWTPs (average values for 2017; for Kuopion vesi, the values are averages for 2018) (based on YLVA, 2019, Kuopion vesi, 2019, Hautakangas 
et al., 2014).  
WWTP Abatement, % Load, kg/y Total abatement cost, €/y 
P N P N P N 
Kuopion vesi, Lehtoniemi 99 39 803 302,950 1,045,800 559,500 
Lapinlahden Vesi Oy, village center 99 94.5 684 10,036 466,200 1,030,300 
Iisalmen vesi 97.5 51.5 438 60,970 459,100 332,700 
City of Kiuruvesi 91.5 16.6 228 14,320 431,100 106,000 
Municipality of Sonkajärvi 85.5 4.2 87 4015 403,800 98,800 
Municipality of Lapinlahti, Varpaisjärvi 98.5 62 15 2712 463,900 460,400 
Runnin ympäristöhuolto Oy 89 58.5 15 417 419,600 414,800 
Kuopion vesi, Kurkimäki 97 5.9 14 3139 456,800 97,500 
Municipality of Leppävirta, Oravikoski 93 29 13 1203 438,000 151,700 
Neuron 98 56.5 2 438 461,500 390,100 
Ylä-Savo Vocational College, Peltosalmi 98 54 0 235 461,500 360,600 
TOTAL   2298 400,436    
Table 3 
Results of increasing phosphorus abatement to 99% in WWTPs.  
WWTP Reduction in P 
load, kg/y 
Increase in 




Iisalmen vesi 263 7100 27 




5 2400 486 
Municipality of 
Sonkajärvi 
81 62,500 772 




11 28,100 2569 
Runnin ympäristöhuolto 
Oy 
13 46,600 3524 
Neuron 1 4700 5234 
TOTAL 584 201,000   
Table 4 
Results of increasing nitrogen abatement to 80% in WWTPs.  
WWTP Reduction in N 
load, kg/y 
Increase in 






203,622 1,138,000 6 
Iisalmen vesi 35,828 410,800 11 
City of Kiuruvesi 10,886 637,400 59 
Municipality of 
Sonkajärvi 




1285 283,000 220 
Kuopion vesi, 
Kurkimäki 




864 591,700 685 
Neuron 236 353,400 1494 
Runnin ympäristöhuolto 
Oy 
216 328,700 1521 
Ylä-Savo Vocational 
College, Peltosalmi 
133 382,800 2877 



























Abatement, kg P/year 
Fig. 6. Average abatement cost for reducing phosphorus loading from WWTPs.  
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in agriculture. 
4.3. Increasing abatement from agricultural nonpoint sources 
Producing nutrient reduction credits from nonpoint sources, such as 
agriculture and forestry, is challenging due to the stochasticity of 
loading and the challenge of finding agricultural practices that effec-
tively reduce loads. Perhaps the most efficient practice is to shift fields 
from annual crops to long-term green fallow. This reduces erosion 
considerably and thereby particulate phosphorus loads and, over time 
also dissolved reactive phosphorus loads. Other practices relating to 
both animal and crop production would provide possibilities to reduce 
nutrient loading as well, but their reductions are not as certain as the 
reduction from green fallow. 
Table 5 presents the potential and costs of providing phosphorus load 
reduction credits produced by shifting fields under cereal cultivation to 
long-term green fallow. Due to this change, the total phosphorus loads 
would decrease by approximately 0.60 kg/ha (based on Helin et al., 
2006). With feed barley as the most common crop in the North Savo 
region (25,400 ha of cultivated and 17,400 ha of harvested area; OSF, 
2019b, 2019c) and continuing single farm payment, the required yearly 
compensation for farmers would equal at the minimum the net profit 
loss from barley yield. In 2019, the profit from the average yield (3670 
kg/ha; OSF, 2019c) subtracted by the variable costs amounted to 47 
€/ha (Tuottopuntari 2019). Accounting also for the establishment (34 
€/ha; Ervola et al., 2018) and maintenance costs (approximately 40 
€/ha; Palva, 2019) of green fallow, we average and round the required 
payment to 100 €/ha. With this payment, the average abatement cost for 
reducing phosphorus loading with green fallowing is 167 €/kg. 
Comparing this to the values in Fig. 6 for WWTPs, this cost is relatively 
low. Note, however, that for WWTPs, the average cost would result in a 
permanent reduction in phosphorus loading (due to technological 
changes), contrary to agriculture, where only yearly reduction would be 
achieved (duration of green fallowing is dependent on the contract 
length). 
The compensation cost would be higher for the buyer in the presence 
of transaction costs. Soil tests and runoff plans needed for the agreement 
cost approximately 25 €/ha as a one-time cost (Lankoski et al., 2010). 
Additionally, negotiations and monitoring could take up approximately 
8% of the per-hectare credit payment (Ollikainen et al., 2008; author 
estimation), i.e., the yearly compensation cost for the pulp mill would 
increase to 108 €/ha. 
Recall the need for using trade ratios to reflect the uncertainty of 
nutrient reduction credits from agricultural nonpoint sources. The 
typical trade ratios in point-nonpoint trading have been greater than 
one. We employ two trade ratios: 1:1 as a benchmark and 1:1.2 to reflect 
the uncertainty of nonpoint loading from green fallow. This trade ratio is 
quite low, but it accounts for the fact that unfertilized green fallow 
provides a higher yearly reduction in the dissolved reactive phosphorus 
loading over time. With a trade ratio of 1, the pulp mill would need to 
buy credits from 12,000 ha to compensate for the 7.3 ton increase in the 
phosphorus load. With a trade ratio of 1.2, the required field area would 
rise to 15,000 ha.3 
4.4. Compensation possibilities 
The pulp mill can compensate its phosphorus loads by buying credits 
from point sources or nonpoint sources or using a combination of credits 
from both sources.4 The planned pulp mill production causes 7.3 t/y of 
phosphorus loading. Table 6 presents the required compensation of 
phosphorus loads and the associated costs from WWTPs when a good 
ecological state of the lake must be achieved by 90% or 80% probability 
and assuming that the delivery ratio of credits, β, is 1 or 0.8. Under 90% 
probability, all loading must be compensated, and under 80% proba-
bility, most but not all loading needs compensation. Referring to 
Table 1, reducing the probability of achieving good ecological status to 
70% or less would entail no compensations. As the maximum additional 
phosphorus abatement from the WWTPs is approximately 0.6 t/y, the 
firm could buy nitrogen reduction credits to match the required 
compensation. Reduction in nitrogen loading affects the ecological sta-
tus of the lake, as shown in Fig. 5. The required compensation in ni-
trogen load is calculated using the Redfield ratio, indicating that algae 
uses phosphorus and nitrogen in ration 1:7.2 (Kiirikki et al., 2003), 
which expresses phosphorus loads as nitrogen equivalents. This facili-
tates determination of the required reduction in nitrogen loading. Note, 
that the N:P ratio varies between watersheds, and the ratio directly af-





























Abatement, t N/year 
Fig. 7. Average abatement cost for reducing nitrogen loading from WWTPs.  
Table 5 
Yearly phosphorus loads and costs of shifting fields from cereal crop cultivation 
to green fallow, transaction costs and the required field area with trade ratios of 
1 and 1.2.   
Value Unit 
Phosphorus load from barleya 0.99 kg/ha 
Phosphorus load from green fallowa 0.39 kg/ha 
Reduction in phosphorus load 0.60 kg/ha 
Net profit from feed barleyb 47 €/ha 
Establishmentc and maintenanced cost of green fallow 34 + 40 €/ha 
Total yearly cost of green fallowing (rounded) 100 €/ha 
Transaction costs: soil testing and runoff plan (once per 
contract)e 
25 €/ha 
Transaction costs: monitoring and negotiations (8% of 
payment)f 
8 €/ha 
Required field area with trade ratio 1 12 1000 
ha 
Required land area with trade ratio 1.2 15 1000 
ha  
a Helin et al. (2006), with erosion value of 800 kg/ha for barley.  
b Tuottopuntari (2019).  
c Ervola et al. (2018).  
d Palva (2019).  
e Lankoski et al. (2010).  
f Monitoring 2% (Ollikainen et al., 2008), negotiations 6% (estimated value).  
3 Green fallow would reduce also nitrogen loading as a positive side effect, 
but in this case, phosphorus reduction potential is high enough. If nitrogen 
compensations were allowed, it would reduce the required area for credits.  
4 The pulp mill could also decrease its loads by reducing the scale of the 
planned production, which under BAT would reduce phosphorus loading 
accordingly. The results for reduced pulp mill scale are presented in the Ap-
pendix in Table A3 for the WWTPs and in Table A4 for agricultural nonpoint 
sources. 
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In Table 6, the unit cost of phosphorus load compensation is deter-
mined using the average abatement cost for each WWTP. Table 6 as-
sumes that the pulp mill first buys as much phosphorus load 
compensation as possible from the WWTPs (0.6 t) and then acquires 
nitrogen reduction credits for the remaining compensation. If the de-
livery ratio is 0.8, 0.6 t of phosphorus reduction only accounts for a 0.5 t 
reduction at the location of the pulp mill, and in the same vein, the 
delivery ratio must also be taken into account for nitrogen. Thus, for a 
delivery ratio of 0.8, abatement and abatement costs are higher than for 
delivery ratio 1. 
The compensation costs from phosphorus are in each case 0.20 M€. 
The costs from nitrogen compensation vary depending on the required 
credit amount: 0.27 M€ and 0.17 M€ for delivery ratio of 1 and good 
status probability of 90% and 80%, respectively, and 0.34 M€ and 0.22 
M€ for delivery ratio of 0.8 and good status probability of 90% and 80%, 
respectively. The total costs of compensation are rather low with the 
highest estimate being 0.5 M€, i.e., 0.03% of the planned 1600 M€ pulp 
mill investment (Finnpulp, 2020). A shift from 90% probability to 80% 
probability would reduce the compensation costs by 22%. Table 6 sug-
gests that the best policy for the pulp mill is to buy credits for full 
compensation and for society sticking to the requirement of at least 90% 
probability for achieving good ecological status of the lake. The sus-
tainability of using nitrogen credits can, however, be challenged, as 
lakes are typically phosphorus constrained. Therefore, it is of interest to 
ask whether agriculture could provide all required phosphorus reduc-
tion credits to ensure that compensation is ecologically sustainable. 
Table 7 collects the results of compensation costs from agriculture. 
With the trade ratio and delivery ratio set to 1, acquiring 7.3 tons of 
phosphorus load compensation from agriculture through green fallow-
ing would require a total of 12,000 ha. The yearly compensation costs 
for the total area are 1.2 M€. We assume that the fallow contract with 
farmers is for 25 years giving the total present value of the compensation 
cost with a 3% discount rate approximately 22 M€. With a trade ratio of 
1.2 and delivery ratio of 0.8, the load reduction at the compensation site 
from green fallowing decreases to 0.48 kg/ha, and the required phos-
phorus load compensation increases to 8.8 tons (i.e., 1.2 times the 7.3 t 
requirement), corresponding to 18,000 ha. The annual compensation 
cost is now 1.8 M€, and the present value of compensation for 25 years 
rises to approximately 33 M€. If the required probability for the good 
ecological status is lowered, the required compensation and the total 
costs also decrease (this is also the case with reduced pulp mill scale, see 
Table A4 in the Appendix for results). All calculated net present values of 
compensation costs are at most 2.1% of the planned 1600 M€ investment 
(Finnpulp, 2020). The land areas listed in Table 7 are large, but the 
associated costs for the pulp mill are quite modest. Thus, compensation 
would be possible in practice, at least for the lowest cost land areas. For 
the highest area requirement, 18,000 ha, grain cultivated areas other 
than feed barley may also need to be included. 
When transaction costs presented in Table 5 are included in the total 
compensation costs, the net present value of compensation costs over 25 
years would amount to 36 M€ and 23 M€ (trade ratio 1.2 and delivery 
ratio 0.8) with 90% and 80% good status probability, respectively. Even 
with the transaction costs, compensations would take at most only 2.2% 
of the planned investment. 
The cost-efficient choice of the pulp mill under a delivery ratio of 0.8 
is as follows (see Table 8): buy 0.6 t phosphorus load compensation from 
WWTPs with a cost of 0.2 M€ to obtain 0.5 t of credits and buy the 
remaining compensation from agriculture. Under a trade ratio of 1.2, 
this gives costs of 31 M€ under 90% probability and 20 M€ under 80% 
probability as a net present value over 25 years. Acquiring compensa-
tions solely from agriculture would be more costly (33 M€ and 21 M€ for 
90% and 80% probabilities, respectively) since compensation from 
WWTPs is permanent, whereas agricultural compensation needs to be 
bought/paid yearly. 
In light of these figures, compensation looks economically and 
ecologically feasible. An important caveat must, however, be made 
concerning slippage and leakage. Slippage refers to the possibility that a 
fallowing farm takes new fields in cultivation within farm boundaries or 
Table 6 
Total compensation costs from the WWTPs, with delivery ratios of 1 and 0.8 and probabilities of good status class of 90% and 80%.  
Delivery ratio Good status probability, % Pulp mill P load, tP/y P compensation N compensation Total cost, M€ 
Required, tP/y Obtained, tP/y Required, tN/y Obtained, tN/y 
1 90 7.3 7.3 0.6 48 48 0.47 
1 80 7.3 4.7 0.6 30 30 0.36 
0.8 90 7.3 7.3 0.5 49 49 0.54 
0.8 80 7.3 4.7 0.5 31 31 0.41  
Table 7 
Total compensation costs from agriculture (for 25 years with a 3% discount rate), required area for green fallowing, and the share of compensation costs from the 













Compensation cost net 
present value, M€ 
Share of cost from pulp 
mill investment, % 
1 1 90 7.3 12 1.2 22 1.4 
1 1 80 4.7 7.9 0.8 14 0.9 
1.2 0.8 90 8.8 18 1.8 33 2.1 
1.2 0.8 80 5.7 12 1.2 21 1.3  
Table 8 
Cost-efficient compensation for the pulp mill with a trade ratio of 1.2 and delivery ratio of 0.8.  
Good status probability Compensation source Compensation, tP (required area, 1000 ha) Compensation cost net present value, M€ Share of investment, % 
90% WWTPs 0.5 0.20  
Agriculture 8.3 (17) 31.0  
Total 8.8 31.2 2.0 
80% WWTPs 0.5 0.20  
Agriculture 5.7 (11) 19.5  
Total 4.7 19.7 1.2  
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increases fertilizer intensity in remaining fields to compensate for the 
reduced crop production (Fleming et al., 2018; Lichtenberg and Smith- 
Ramirez, 2011, and Shortle et al., 2021). This would increase farm 
phosphorus loads to the lake and reduce the load reduction. Leakage 
refers to phosphorus load increases over the whole area due to increased 
demand for crops (Roberts and Bucholz, 2006; Wu, 2000, 2005). Both 
features would reduce the actual reduction of loads that credits would 
provide. Assessing slippage is in general difficult. However, entry of new 
fields is unlikely, as these fields would not be eligible for the single farm 
payment in CAP. Thus, farmers could allocate some existing field parcels 
to cereal crops from other uses, but this would most likely have only 
minor impacts on P loads. Leakage may play a larger role. The shift of 
17,000 ha from feed barley to green fallow would result in a 62 million 
kg reduction in the local supply of feed barley, creating demand for 
other feed sources for the area’s large beef and milk production. As a 
comparison, in 2018/2019 in Finland, the total amount of grains used as 
feed in industry was 562 million kg, and on farms, it was 1063 million kg 
(Natural Resources Institute Finland, 2021). 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
We examined how nutrient load compensation can help a firm 
expand its production when production causes nutrient loads threat-
ening the ecological status of a water body. Nutrient effluents to wa-
terways are regional emissions, indicating that nutrient load reduction 
at the source differs from the actual reduction at the compensation site. 
This was taken into account using delivery ratios. A second complicating 
matter related to the sources of nutrient load reduction credits. In 
contrast to point sources, reduction credits from nonpoint sources are 
uncertain and subject to stochastic variation. This was taken into ac-
count using trade ratios. The third issue related how to define the good 
ecological status of the water body subject to all uncertainties; we 
adopted a probabilistic approach. 
We assessed these issues against the case of the Finnish Lake Kalla-
vesi, where the Supreme Administrative Court denied the environmental 
permit for a plan to build a large pulp mill because of the risk of wors-
ening the lake’s good ecological status (SACF, 2019:166). In the chosen 
case, the increase in phosphorus loads from the planned pulp mill was 
rather high, at 7.3 t/y, threatening the goal of keeping the lake in good 
ecological condition with 80% probability at the minimum. In the cost- 
efficient solution, the pulp mill utilized the whole phosphorus reduction 
potential from point sources (WWTPs) and bought the rest of the credits 
from agricultural nonpoint sources. Credits were generated from a shift 
to long-term green fallow, which provides a fairly certain reduction in 
phosphorus loading and thus facilitates a low trade ratio. The cost of full 
compensation was quite low, 31 M€ in total, suggesting that compen-
sation is a good opportunity for the pulp mill. Our findings are in line 
with Shabman and Stephenson (2007), who found that buying credits 
from nonpoint sources could allow new point source companies to enter 
the market when water quality objectives cannot be met by the company 
alone. Allowing nonpoint sources to provide credits also has the po-
tential to lower the overall costs from nutrient load reductions. 
Our analysis suggests that nutrient load compensation could play a 
role in investments causing nutrient loading, in tightening abatement 
policy, or in strict water protection, which the Weser ruling represents. 
There are, however, multiple economic and ecological issues that soci-
ety must evaluate concerning nutrient load compensations. 
Starting with economics, transaction costs impact the costs of 
compensation, and slippage and leakage matter greatly for the ecolog-
ical integrity of compensation. Long-term green fallow is easy to 
establish and monitor, which keeps transaction costs low and lower than 
in many other possible agricultural practices, as also shown for CAP 
policy by Ollikainen et al. (2008). The downside of using green fallow is 
a clear reduction in agricultural production and an increased risk for 
slippage and leakage. Both tend to increase phosphorus loading and 
reduce the actual load reduction at the compensation site. Estimation of 
this impact is difficult, and the literature has not produced a clear un-
derstanding of its empirical relevance (Stephenson and Shabman, 2017). 
Our estimate was that in the Kallavesi case, large feed barley areas 
transformed to green fallow would create high demand for other feed 
sources for cattle and, thus, a risk for leakage outside the area. 
A topic that relates to both economic and ecological impacts relates 
to the possibility of generating nitrogen reduction credits as compen-
sation for phosphorus loads. Although reductions in nitrogen loading 
may affect the overall status class and the abatement possibilities for 
nitrogen are relatively high, phytoplankton growth in lakes is primarily 
limited by phosphorus availability (Schindler, 1977). However, nitrogen 
limitation, or colimitation of both phosphorus and nitrogen, can occur in 
certain conditions, especially on shorter time scales than in multiannual 
time scale and in shallow lakes (Sterner, 2008; Maberly et al., 2020). 
Therefore, nitrogen load compensation may be feasible in a similar 
setting as in Lake Kallavesi, especially if the water body is limited by 
both phosphorus and nitrogen or limited solely by nitrogen. Even in 
primarily phosphorus-limited sites, once the input of phosphorus has 
been reduced, it is worthwhile to explore whether further ecological 
benefits of reducing nitrogen exist (Maberly et al., 2020). 
Concerning the ecological integrity of compensations, there is always 
uncertainty related to the nutrient load response model assessments, 
which causes risks in decision-making. We used a simple water quality 
model accounting only for the aggregated spatiotemporal level yet ac-
counting for the natural variation with the probabilistic approach. 
Model development is always a compromise between model complexity, 
data availability and modeling resources. This is particularly true for 
lake management models, which are required to be quick to use, readily 
usable at new locations, and at spatiotemporal dimensions relevant for 
the decision-making in question (see, e.g., Schuwirth et al., 2019). In 
Finland and in other Nordic countries, the number of lakes (and water 
bodies) is very high, making it impossible to monitor all the biological 
quality elements in a sufficient manner, thus limiting the data avail-
ability and model complexity (Andersen et al., 2016; Hjerppe et al., 
2016). The complex nature of human-environment relationships, the 
high natural variation in environmental conditions and the lack of 
empirical data all affect the uncertainty of the modeled responses 
(Refsgaard et al., 2007). Some of these uncertainties can be reduced, but 
it should be acknowledged that decisions made based on assessment 
results are never risk-free. Therefore, the loading response assessment 
should consider the uncertainty in the results, as we did in our case. 
Depending on the risk of violating good water quality standards that the 
decision maker is willing to accept, the phosphorus load compensation 
in the lake Kallavesi case could vary from 0 kg/y (risk 30% or more) to 
7.3 t/y (risk less than 10%). The key question is what the applied 
probability should be in society. Usually, following a safe minimum 
standard is recommended in cases where uncertainty prevails (see, e.g., 
Heywood, 1995). This does not, however, give any specific number. 
Public debate on feasible criteria is needed. We calculated the critical 
phosphorus loads with different risk levels without making a statement 
of the proper risk level. This kind of procedure could be used in practice 
as well to showcase the relationship of loads, risks and probabilities. 
The second issue relates to the spatial and temporal aspects of 
compensation. In our case, the lake is small and the area from which the 
credit supply was defined was based on a geographically rather narrow 
area. How much of a geographical area from the catchment can be taken 
for nutrient reduction credits may in most cases be decisive for the 
compensation potential. Another complicating factor is that the timing 
of the actual reduction by credits (supply of credits) often may differ 
from the increase in nutrient runoff (demand for credits). If compen-
sating measures are taken only after the load increase (e.g., green fal-
lowing is not realized immediately for agronomic reasons), it risks 
maintaining the current ecological status. This intertemporality of load 
increase and decrease could be accounted for by higher trade ratios 
(Cook and Shortle, 2018), or an insurance or reserve ratio could be used 
to set aside a fixed share of credits, building up a reserve pool (Selman 
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et al., 2009) to prepare for various situations. In addition, the lakes’ 
ecological status is assessed for the growing season, namely, July–Au-
gust for phytoplankton and June–September for nutrients (EU, 2003); 
therefore, the effect of load increase or reduction might be different 
within different time periods. 
Finding sufficient answers to the presented challenges is necessary to 
allow nutrient load compensation to provide solutions for investment 
bans due to the WFD and Weser ruling. Compensation would help in 
unravelling the high abatement potential of agriculture, which the 
present policy is not able to do. Currently, nutrient load compensation is 
not allowed in Finland. Enabling compensation would be one step to-
ward more adaptive management and governance of our waters. 
Adaptive governance would allow more flexibility in fulfilling the re-
quirements regarding nutrient loading reductions as well as other 
environmental goals. 
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Additional data and results  
Table A1 
LLR input data for modeling of Lake Kallavesi: incoming annual nutrient loads and lake concentrations and water outflow from the lake.  
Year Nitrogen load (kg/d) Phosphorus load (kg/d) Nitrogen conc. (μg/l) Phosphorus conc. (μg/l) Water outflow (m3s− 1) 
1991 13,364.49 440.566 557.1429 15.28571 157.945 
1992 14,909.7 499.9737 697.1429 17.85714 166.814 
1993 14,264.6 432.6792 682.8571 22.57143 152.842 
1994 13,701.43 423.1611 630 20 145.755 
1995 12,927.23 426.5212 610 18.11111 144.589 
1996 10,075.53 328.4873 518.75 15.5 119.623 
1997 10,632.7 330.9653 620 14.85714 123.715 
1998 14,673.42 479.6687 594.2857 18.14286 168.842 
1999 9499.079 294.6331 625.7143 18.85714 105.743 
2000 12,763.42 406.6919 656 18.65 143.226 
2001 10,364.25 339.3738 706.3636 19.09091 124.065 
2002 7365.112 233.6329 659.0909 17 91.167 
2003 7534.411 232.4012 650 15.09091 89.911 
2004 12,857.58 468.5431 712.3077 21.46154 177.09 
2005 9810.921 340.5677 841.6667 24.63636 124.545 
2006 9370.142 281.9616 870.8333 21.30769 103.072 
2007 12,256.19 406.0394 828.4615 21.6 155.012 
2008 14,357.23 549.7275 776.6667 22.6 196.568 
2009 9090.156 283.2351 754.2857 22.85714 102.037 
2010 9142.134 265.725 807.1429 21 105.472 
2011 9511.049 301.3674 750 16.6875 119.503 
2012 16,057.64 586.88 755.7143 23.78571 214.04 
2013 11,943.94 411.7861 852.8571 26.42857 139.016 
2014 11,973 416.3966 769.2857 24.5 156.845 
2015 14,143.18 526.2276 731.6667 23.47619 193.046 
2016 10,967.3 388.2791 757.381 25.54762 151.438 
2017 11,223.45 386.7345 623.8095 20.03571 154.886   
Table A2 
Baseline phosphorus loading from the 10 largest point sources other 
than WWTPs to Kallavesi (average yearly values from 2010 to 2018) 
(source: VEMALA).  
Point source P load, kg/y 
Powerflute Oy (former Savon Sellu Oy) 2129 
Terhontammi Oy, Konnuslahti fish farm 117 
VAPO OY, Konnunsuo, Pyhäntä 106 
VAPO OY, Kaikonsuo 84 
Heinäsuon Turve Oy, Heinäsuo, Vieremä 79 
VAPO OY, Pihlajasuo 49 
Kuopion Energia, Rikkasuo, Kiuruvesi 48 
VAPO OY, Heinäsuo and Kokkosuo 46 
VAPO OY, Peräsuo/Härkäsuo 45 
Kuopion Energia, Kukkosuo, Vieremä 44   
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Table A3 
Total compensation costs from the WWTPs, with delivery ratios of 1 and 0.8 with the baseline scale of pulp mill production, for cases where this scale is reduced by 10% 
or 20%, and with the probability of good status class of 90% and 80%.   
Pulp mill P load, tP/y P compensation N compensation, tN/y Cost from P, 1000 € Cost from N, 1000€ Total cost, 1000 € 
Required, tP/y Obtained, tP/y 
Delivery ratio 1, good status probability 90%  
Baseline scale 7.3 7.3 0.6 48 196 270 466 
Scale reduced by 10% 6.6 6.6 0.6 43 196 241 437 
Scale reduced by 20% 5.8 5.8 0.6 38 196 211 407  
Delivery ratio 1, good status probability 80%  
Baseline scale 7.3 4.7 0.6 30 196 167 363 
Scale reduced by 10% 6.6 4.7 0.6 30 196 167 363 
Scale reduced by 20% 5.8 4.7 0.6 30 196 167 363  
Delivery ratio 0.8, good status probability 90%  
Baseline scale 7.3 7.3 0.5 49 196 344 540 
Scale reduced by 10% 6.6 6.6 0.5 44 196 307 503 
Scale reduced by 20% 5.8 5.8 0.5 39 196 270 466  
Delivery ratio 0.8, good status probability 80%  
Baseline scale 7.3 4.7 0.5 31 196 215 411 
Scale reduced by 10% 6.6 4.7 0.5 31 196 215 411 
Scale reduced by 20% 5.8 4.7 0.5 31 196 215 411   
Table A4 
Total compensation costs from agriculture (for 25 years with a 3% discount rate), required area for green fallowing, and the share of compensation costs from the 
planned pulp mill investment (1600 M€) with varying pulp mill scale, probability of maintaining good status, trade ratio and delivery ratio.   




Annual compensation cost, 
M€/y 
Compensation cost net present 
value, M€ 
Share of cost from pulp mill 
investment, % 
Trade ratio 1, delivery ratio 1, good status probability 90% 
Baseline scale 7.3 12 1.2 22 1.4 
Scale reduced by 
10% 
6.6 11 1.1 20 1.2 
Scale reduced by 
20% 
5.8 10 1.0 17 1.1  
Trade ratio 1, delivery ratio 1, good status probability 80% 
Baseline scale 4.7 8 0.8 14 0.9 
Scale reduced by 
10% 
4.7 8 0.8 14 0.9 
Scale reduced by 
20% 
4.7 8 0.8 14 0.9  
Trade ratio 1.2, delivery ratio 0.8, good status probability 90% 
Baseline scale 8.8 18 1.8 33 2.0 
Scale reduced by 
10% 
7.9 16 1.6 29 1.8 
Scale reduced by 
20% 
7.0 15 1.5 26 1.5  
Trade ratio 1.2, delivery ratio 0.8, good status probability 80% 
Baseline scale 5.7 12 1.2 21 1.3 
Scale reduced by 
10% 
5.7 12 1.2 21 1.3 
Scale reduced by 
20% 
5.7 12 1.2 21 1.3  
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447. TTS Työtehoseura (in Finnish).  
Pilke, A. (Ed.), 2012. Ohje pintaveden tyypin määrittämiseksi 2012. Finnish 
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